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Shannon Kathleen O'Byrne*

Damages for Mental Distress
and Other Intangible Loss in
a Breach of Contract Action

As a general rule, contracts law does not permit an award of general damages
for mental distress or other intangible loss. There are several rationales for this,
including: plaintiffs are to bear their disappointment or upset with mental fortitude;
without the rule, courts would be awash in litigation since every breach of contract
brings with it some degree of emotional distress; without the rule, plaintiffs may
fabricate or exaggerate the degree of their upset; and the rule simply reflects the
lack of foreseeability of such loss under Hadley v. Baxendale.
Notwithstanding the general rule, courts have awarded mental distress in a variety
of circumstances by following one of three strategies to do so: permitting recovery
when the contract is non-commercial; permitting recovery when the contract fits
within a special or established category of exception to the general rule; and
permitting recovery on the basis of foreseeability principles alone.
There are a number of reasons to critique the general rule, particularly in light of
the House of Lord's much more expansive approach in Farley v. Skinner, [2001]
3 WL.R. 899. In short, an under-inclusive approach to this question results in
contracts only being partially enforceable - a result contrary to the foundational
principles that parties should be held to their bargain. Based on Farley, this paper
offers a proposed restatement of the general rule. It also offers a way of clearly
distinguishing between aggravated damages, on the one hand, and general
damages for mental distress, on the other
En regle gen6rale, le droit des contrats ne permet pas I'adjudication de
dommages-inter~ts g6n6raux pour la souffrance morale ou autre pr6judice moral.
IIy a pour cela plusieurs raisons, notamment: les parties demanderesses doivent
supporter leur deception ou leurs ennuis avec grandeur d'#me; sans cette regle,
les tribunaux seraient inond6s de reclamations puisque chaque violation de
contrat cause une certaine detresse psychologique; sans cette r~gle, les parties
demanderesses pourraient inventer des ennuis ou exag~rer leur importance; et la
r~gle ne fait que refl~ter I'imprevisibilit6 des pertes, comme le tout a dtd 6noncd
dans Hadley v. Baxendale.
Par d6rogation j la r~gle gdn~rale, les tribunaux ont accord6 des dommagesinter~ts pour souffrance morale dans diverses circonstances en adoptant I'une
des trois strat6gies suivantes : ils ont permis le recouvrement lorsqu'il s'agit d'un
contrat non commercial; lorsque le contrat s'inscrit dans une categorie sp6ciale
ou etablit des exceptions a la r~gle g~n~rale; et exclusivement sur la base des
principes de previsibilit6.
II y a de nombreuses raisons pour critiquer la regle gen~rale, en particulier 6
la lumi~re de l'interprdtation beaucoup plus liberale de la House of Lord dans
Farley v. Skinner, [2001] 3 WL.R. 899. En bref, une interpr6tation trop limitative de
la question a pour resultat que les contrats ne sont que partiellement ex6cutoires,
resultatcontraire au principe fondamental que les parties sont tenues de respecter
leurs engagements. Sappuyant sur I'arr6tFarley cet article propose une nouvelle
formulation de la regle g6n~rale. II presente en outre une m6thode pour 6tablir
une distinction claire entre, d'une part, les dommages-int6r~ts majores et, d'autre
part, les dommages pour souffrance morale.
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Introduction
The general rule in contracts is that a plaintiff is not entitled to general
damages for mental distress and other intangibles such as annoyance,
humiliation, upset, disappointment, frustration, anguish, or anxiety in the
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face of breach. There are a number of reasons why this is so - both
practical and theory-driven. First, contract law has historically limited
recovery for breach of contract to financial loss only. As the House of
Lords recently stated in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co., "[c]ontract-breaking
is treated as an incident of commercial life which players in the game are
expected to meet with mental fortitude."' For a distinct but related second
reason, courts are wary of opening the floodgates of contractual damages
tied to the plaintiff's emotional suffering.2 As Justice Newbury of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal has observed, given that in almost every
contractual scenario, the innocent party will experience some emotional
upset in the face of breach, judicial parameters have been erected to limit
successful claims in this area.' Third, there is a concern over problems of
proof and claim inflation. According to David Capper, "[t]his reticence
about compensating for intangible losses is sensible also because of the
risk of claimants who have suffered no real damages harassing defendants
by artificially inflating their damages and alleging all kinds of minor losses

Professor and Associate Dean Graduate Studies and Research, Faculty of Law, University of
Alberta. I would like to thank for their helpful commentary on an earlier draft of this paper Mr. James
McGinnis of Parlee McLaws and Dean David Percy of the Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. I
would also like to thank Professor Ronnie Cohen of Christopher Newport University for her many
insights in this area. I would also like to gratefully acknowledge research funding assistance from the
Foundation for Legal Research as well as the outstanding research assistance of Ms. Maria Teeling.
Errors and omissions remain my own.
Much of this article is based on a presentation to the National Judicial Institute's Annual Civil
Law Conference, held May 12-14, 2004 in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. For application
of some of the research in this paper to the franchise contract, see Shannon Kathleen O'Byrne,
"Breach of Good Faith in Performance of the Franchise Contract: Punitive Damages and Damages for
Intangibles" (2004) 83 Can. Bar. Rev. 431. For expansion of this research to a Canada-United States
comparison, see Ronnie Cohen and Shannon O'Byrne, "Cry Me a River: Recovery of Mental Distress
Damages in a Breach of Contract Action - A North American Perspective" (2005) 42 Am. Bus. L.J.
97.
1. Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co., [2001] 2 W.L.R. 72 (H.L.) at 108 [Johnson]. As Pollock C.B.
observed in Hamlin v. GreatNorthern Railway Company (1865), 1 H. & N. 408 (reprinted at 156 E.R.
Ex. 1261) at 1262 [Hamlin]: "[e]ach case of this description must be decided with reference to the
circumstances peculiar to it; but it may be laid down as a rule, that generally in actions upon contracts
no damages can be given which cannot be stated specifically, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
whatever damages naturally result from the breach of contract, but not damages for the disappointment
of mind occasioned by the breach of contract."
2.
See E. Veitch, "Sentimental Damages in Contract" (1978) 16 U.W.O.L.Rev. 227 at 231; Andrew
Phang, "The Crumbling Edifice? - The Award of Contractual Damages for Mental Distress" (2003)
J.Bus.L. 341 at 350.
3.
Warrington v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. (1996), 139 D.L.R. (4th) 18 (B.C.C.A.) at para.
15 [Warrington],citing English authority such as Hayes v. James & CharlesDodd, [1990] 2 All E.R.
815 (C.A.). Accord Watts v. Morrow, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1421 at 1445 [Watts], where the court notes
that the general rule against recovery for intangible loss is not founded on the assumption "that such
reactions are not foreseeable, which they surely are or may be, but on considerations of policy." But
see discussion, infra, note 99 and surrounding text where recovery for mental distress was denied on
the basis that it was not reasonably foreseeable.
*
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to which they are largely indifferent."'4 Fourth, since many plaintiffs in
commercial litigation are corporations, they are not capable of suffering
mental distress or aggravation and therefore cannot recover same.5 Fifth,
damages for mental distress in the commercial context are reasonably
uncommon due to the remoteness principle of Hadley v. Baxendale.6
This paper explores, from a common law perspective, the complicated
question of when the plaintiff is entitled to mental distress damages in a
breach of contract action. Part I begins with some definitions and seeks to
distinguish mental distress damages from aggravated damages and punitive
damages. This section will also account for those occasions when punitive
damages and aggravated damages are awarded in the contractual arena.
Part II analyses exceptions to the rule of no recovery for mental distress
which are based on three approaches: (a) recovery only where the contract
in question is non-commercial; (b) on a related front, recovery only if the
contract fits within an established category of exceptions to the general
rule; or (c) recovery whenever the remoteness test of Hadley v. Baxendale
is met. Part III identifies some overarching rules governing recovery for
mental distress, regardless of the approach followed. Part IV provides a
critique of the general rule. Part V offers a proposed restatement of the
general rule. Part VI offers a brief set of conclusions.
I. Definitions and distinctions: punitive damages, aggravateddamages,
andgeneral damagesfor mental distress in the contractualarena
1. Punitive or exemplary damages
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance
Co., punitive damages (also called exemplary damages)7 are awarded only
where there has been "malicious, oppressive and high-handed misconduct
that 'offends the court's sense of decency."' 8 As summarized in a recent

David Capper, "Damages for Distress and Disappointment - the Limits of Watts v. Morrow"
4.
(2000) 116 L.Q.R. 553 at 553.
5.
See, for example, Pinewood Recording Studios Ltd. v. City Tower Dev. Corp., [1998] B.C.J.
No. 1977 (C.A.) at para. 72 [PinewoodRecording Studios] and cases cited therein. See too Walker v.
CFTO Ltd. (1987), 37 D.L.R. (4th) 224 (Ont. C.A.) [Walker] (a defamation case). Walker has been
followed in non-defamation cases as well, including Hide-Away Resort Ltd v. Van der Wal, [1999]
B.C.J. No. 234 (S.C.). For further discussion of this, see infra atfootnote 30 and accompanying text.
6.
Hadley v. Baxendale, [1843-60] All E.R. 461 at 465 [Hadley].
As Bruce Feldthusen notes, the labels "exemplary" and "punitive" damages are used
7.
interchangeably in Canada with "punitive" being the more commonly chosen one. Accordingly, this
paper will do likewise. See Bruce Feldthusen, "Punitive Damages in Canada: Hard Choices and High
Stakes" (1998) N.Z.L. Rev. 741 at 742.
8.
Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co. (2002), 209 D.L.R. (4th) 257, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595 at para. 36
[Whiten].
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article in the Advocates' Quarterly,9 the court in Whiten provided a set of
principles governing the award of punitive damages as follows:
1. The attempt to limit punitive damages to "categories" does not work
and "was rightly rejected in Canada in Vorvis."
2. The general objectives of punitive damages are "punishment (in the
sense of retribution), deterrence of the wrongdoer and others, and
denunciation."
3. The main venue for punishment is criminal law so that "punitive
damages should be resorted to only in exceptional cases and with
restraint."
4. Merely reciting the "time-honoured pejoratives ('high-handed',
'oppressive', 'vindictive', etc.)" does not provide adequate guidance
to judges and juries setting quantum.
5. Punitive damages must be awarded rationally. The award must
further at least one objective of the law of punitive damages and
at the lowest amount that would serve that purpose ("because any
higher award would be irrational").
6. Wrongdoers should be disgorged of profits via punitive damages
where compensatory damages would not provide adequate deterrence
for "outrageous disregard of the legal or equitable rights of others."
7. Courts should not engage in a mechanical or formulaic approach
- such as a fixed cap - to punitive damages as this does not
provide sufficient flexibility. As Justice Binnie admonished: the
"proper focus is not on the plaintiff's loss but on the defendant's
misconduct."
8. Quantum must be directly tied to proportionality. According to the
court, the overall award, that is to say compensatory damages plus
punitive damages plus any other punishment related to the same
misconduct should be rationally related to the objectives for which
the punitive damages are awarded (retribution, deterrence and
denunciation).
9. Juries should receive considerable guidance from the trial judge,
including being told "in some detail" about the function of punitive
damages and the factors to assess.

9.
See Shannon Kathleen O'Byrne and Evaristus Oshionebo, "Punitive Damages and the
Requirement for an Independent Actionable Wrong: Whitten v. Pilot Insurance Co." (2002) 25
Advocates' Q. 496 at 499-501. (footnotes omitted)
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10. Punitive damages are not at large and for this reason, appellate courts
are entitled to intervene "if the award exceeds the outer boundaries
of a rational and measured response to the facts of the case." 0

In addition to establishing that the defendant conducted itself
outrageously, the plaintiff must also show that the defendant has
committed an independent actionable wrong. Put another way, the
defendant must have committed a wrong separate and distinct from
the breach being sued upon." This independent actionable wrong
can be a tort or a breach of contract though the latter circumstance
12
would be admittedly rare.
As for the appeal in Whiten, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed
a jury award of $1 million in punitive damages because the insurer
wrongfully and maliciously denied cover under a fire insurance policy,
alleging arson when all evidence pointed to the fire being accidental. The
breach of contract sued upon was the insurer's refusal to pay out on the
policy. The separate actionable wrong was in the insurer's failure to handle
the claim according to the standard of good faith. The malicious conduct
was in the insurer's unfounded allegation of arson.
More recently, in Triple 3 Holdings Inc. v. Jan the court awarded the
franchisee $350,000 in punitive damages due to the defendants' stunningly
outrageous behaviour which included: physically pushing around one of
the franchisees; demanding rental arrears which did not exist; locking
the franchisee out of the premises without justification; and proceeding
with sale of the franchise despite the plaintiffs' pending application for

10. Whiten, supra note 8 at paras. 67-76. There have been a number of other case comments on
the Whiten. See for example: St6phane Beaulac, "Les Donmnages-int~rfts punitifs depuis l'affaire
Whiten et les leqons Aen tirer pour le droit civil qu~b~cois"(2002) 36 R.J.T. 637; David Debenham.
"Coming armed with Spiers: insuring good faith processing of policy claims in the post-Whiten age"
(2003) 27 Advocates' Q. 5; Craig E. Jones and John C. Kleefeld, "Whiten v. Pilot: safe harbour for
punitive contract damages?" (2002) 60 Advocate (Van.) 507; G.E. (Gerry) Kruk, "The Supreme Court
in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance:judicial rationality or supreme outrage?" (2002) 35 C.C.L.I. (3d) 112;
Rudy V. Buller, "Whiten v. Pilot: Controlling jury awards of punitive damages" (2003) 36 U.B.C. L.
Rev. 357; Kathryn L. Seely, "Punitive damage awards in Canada: enlarging in scope and size" (2002)
Ann. Rev. Civil Lit. 147; St6phane Beaulac, "A Comparative look at punitive damages in Canada"
(2002) 17 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 351.
11.
Whiten, supra note 8 at para. 78. 1 have argued elsewhere that the requirement for a separate
actionable wrong is based on a misreading of Vorvis v. Insurance Corporationof British Columbia,
[1989] 1S.C.R. 1085. See Shannon O'Byrne and Evaristus Oshionebo, "Punitive Damages and the
Requirement of an Independent Actionable Wrong," supranote 9.
12. Per Justice Binnie in Whiten, supra note 8 at para. 81, citing Royal Bank of Canadav. W Got &
Associates Electric Ltd., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 408 [Got] at para. 26, as well as Vorvis, supra note 11.
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relief against forfeiture. As Justice Taliano stated: "[c]ommercial activities
cannot be conducted like piracy on the high seas."' 3
Other examples of when punitive damages are awarded in a commercial
context include oppression in corporate law, 14 wrongful receiverships, 5

13. Triple 3 Holdings Inc. v. Jan, (2004), 48 B.L.R. (3d) 296 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 39 [Triple 3
Holdings Inc.]. For another example of a court awarding punitive damages in a franchise context,
see Katotikidis v. Mr Submarine Ltd. (2002), 26 B.L.R. (3d) 140 and (2002), 29 B.L.R. (3d) 258
(Ont. S.C.J.) [Mr.Sub.]. The Ontario Superior Court awarded $10,000 in punitive damages against the
franchisor because it had "betrayed the trust that epitomizes the relationship between a franchisor and
franchisee" ((2002), 26 B.L.R. (3d) 140 at para. 75), including abandoning its franchisee at a failing
outlet.
14. The law in this area is somewhat unsettled. See, for example, Waxman v. Waxman (2002), 25
B.L.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. S.C.J.), varied on other, very minor grounds at (2004), 44 B.L.R. (3d) 165 (C.A.),
leave to appeal refused [2004] S.C.C. No. 291. According to Justice Sanderson at trial, punitive
" See too Justice Dilks in Beck v.
damages "may also be awarded under the oppression remedy ....
Dumais (2003), 33 B.L.R. (3d) 118 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Jus.) at para. 134 who states: "[p]unitive damages
are awarded in the discretion of the court in cases where the conduct of the defendant is so egregious
that normal damages will not adequately express society's disapproval. A large component of the
damages in the instant case is as a result of a finding of oppression which requires conduct of almost
the same nature. This is not one of those cases where an additional sanction is necessary." Finally, see
White v. True North Spring Ltd. (2002), 219 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. I (S.C.(T.D)) at para. 66, wherein the trial
judge notes that the oppression remedy is corrective, not punitive.
15. Got, supra note 12, wherein the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the lower court's award
of $100,0000 punitive damages in a case where the bank appointed a receiver on insufficient notice.
From a punitive perspective, of particular concern was that the bank tendered a misleading affadavit
to secure the receivership order, including the suggestion that the bank had reason to believe that Got
would move inventory. Affirming the award of punitive damages, the Supreme Court of Canada stated
at para. 29: "[v]iewing the trial judge's concerns cumulatively, and giving due weight to the advantage
he had to assess the need for deterrence and condemnation of the abuse of the court's process, as well
as the need to maintain proper business practices, we are not prepared to interfere with the award for
exemplary damages in this case."
Note that in Got, the Supreme Court of Canada took the very unusual step of permitting punitive
damages even absent an independent actionable wrong. For discussion of this point, see Jamie
Edelman, "Exemplary Damages for Breach of Contract" (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 539. See too Ronald
Elwyn Lister Ltd v. Dayton Tire CanadaLtd (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 88 (C.A.) where the franchisee's
punitive damages award for a wrongful receivership was reduced to $20,000.
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abuse ofprocess, 6 conspiracy, 7 conversion, 8 inducing breach of contract, 9
and fraud (such as representing goods to be new when they are in fact
used).2" Punitive damages are also a regular feature of class actions.2'
These examples notwithstanding, the Supreme Court of Canada
has confirmed in Royal Bank v. Got Electric, that an award of punitive
damages in a commercial dispute "will remain an extraordinary remedy."22
However - to name a few examples - where one party owes the other a
fiduciary duty23 or a duty of good faith pursuant to a franchise agreement

(as in Triple 3 Holdings) or pursuant to an insurance contract (as in
Whiten), the door is wide open for punitives. Indeed, the fact that such
duties are owed to begin with signals that the plaintiff is vulnerable to
harm, on the one hand, and the defendant has the opportunity to cause that
harm, on the other.

16. See Got, supra note 12.
17. In ClaiborneIndustries Ltd. v. National Bank of Canada, (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 533 (Ont.
C.A.), punitive damages were awarded against the individual defendants (in the amounts of $50,000
and $200,000) and the bank. The Court of Appeal found that the Bank conspired with the individual
defendants and knowingly assisted one of them in his illegal conduct. According to the court, "[t]his
conduct cannot be tolerated by the Court. It clearly falls within the type of unconscionable conduct
said to deserve punishment...; it requires an award which will stand as an example to others and at
the same time assure that the Bank does not unduly profit from its investment" at 565-566. On this
footing, the Bank was ordered to pay punitive damages of 70% of all the other awards made against
it.

18. InPredovich v. Armstrong(1997),74 C.P.R. (3d) 351 (Ont. Gen. Div.), the defendant wrongfully
converted the plaintiff's property. In response, the court awarded, inter alia, punitive or exemplary
damages of $500,000.
19. In Kaur v. Moore Estate, [2003] O.J. No. 1588, Justice Ferguson awarded punitive damages
of $10,000 against the estate of the vendor, and $25,000 against the vendor's son-in-law. The estate
was liable for breach of contract to sell real estate, while the son-in-law was liable for conspiracy and
inducing breach of contract for encouraging his father-in-law, Moore, to groundlessly rescind the
contract in question.
20. In 473759 Alta. Ltd. v. Heidelberg Can. Graphic Equipment, [1995] 5 W.W.R. 214 (Alta. Q.B.)
$7,500 in punitive damages was awarded because the defendant fraudulently sold used equipment as
new. See too Brown & Root Services Corp. v. Aerotech Herman Nelson Inc., [2003] 10 W.W.R. 339
(Man. Q.B.) where the defendant sold military surplus heaters as being new. Per Justice McKelvey
at para. 119: "[iun this regard, I allow B&R $50,000.00 punitive damages as ... 'it is completely
appropriate that the thief be punished."'
21. See, for example, Peppiat v. Nicol (2001), 148 O.A.C. 105 (C.A.) where an award of punitive
damages for breach of fiduciary duty in a class action law suit was affirmed; Alie v. Bertrand& Frere
ConstructionCo. (2000), 11 C.L.R. (3d) 19 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Jus.) (where the claim for punitive damages
was dismissed), partially varied on other grounds, (2003), 26 C.L.R. (3d) 78 (Ont. C.A.). See too cases
involving pre-trial matters under class action legislation where punitives are sought in the statement
of claim, including: Wilson v.Servier CanadaInc., (2000), 50 O.R. 21 (Sup. Ct.) (allegedly defective
diet pills); and Fakhriv. Alfalfa s CanadaInc. (c.o.b. CapersCommunity Market) (2003), 26 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 152 (S.C.) (customers infected by hepatitis due to sickness of defendant's employee). A recent
example of a class action seeking punitive damages is Caputo v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd., (2004), 42
B.L.R. (3d) 276 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Jus.) where the test for certification was not met.
22. Got, supranote 12 at para. 29.
23. Hardman Group Ltd. v. Alexander (2003), 215 N.S.R. (2d) 280 (S.C.) and 692331 Ontario Ltd.
v. Garay(1997), 36 B.L.R. (2d) 231 (Ont. Gen. Div.), appeal dismissed [1999] O.J. No. 4008 (C.A.).
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2. Aggravated damage
When a court awards aggravated damages, it is not punishing the defendant
but compensating the plaintiff for "the additional harm caused to the
plaintiff's feelings by reprehensible or outrageous conduct on the part of
the defendant. '24 According to Justice Binnie (in dissent) in Whiten,
Aggravated damages served the traditional corrective purpose of the
common law: to make the plaintiff whole for injuries to interests that
are not properly compensable
by ordinary damages. Punitive damages
25
target not loss, but conduct.
Aggravated damages assess non-pecuniary loss and determine whether, at
the time of breach, the manner26 of the defendant's breach "aggravated"
the damages suffered by the plaintiff. As the British Columbia Court of
Appeal observes in Huff v. Price:
[A]ggravated damages are an award, or an augmentation of an award,
of compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses. They are designed
to compensate the plaintiff, and they are measured by the plaintiff's
suffering. Such intangible elements as pain, anguish, grief, humiliation,
wounded pride, damaged self-confidence or selfesteem, loss of faith in
friends or colleagues, and similar matters that are caused by the conduct
of the defendant; that are of the type that the defendant should reasonably
have foreseen in tort cases or had in contemplation in contract cases; that
cannot be said to be fully compensated for in an award for pecuniary
losses; and that are sufficiently significant in depth, or duration, or
both, that they represent a significant influence on the plaintiff's life,
can properly be the basis for the making of an award for non-pecuniary
losses or for the augmentation of such an award. An award of that kind
is frequently referred to as aggravated damages. It is, of course, not
the damages that are aggravated but the injury. The damage award is
for aggravation of
the injury by the defendant s high-handed conduct
27
[emphasis added.]

In addition to showing highhanded conduct, the plaintiff must establish
that the defendant committed an independent actionable wrong. 8 Where
a contractual duty of good faith is owed, demonstrating an independent
24. Whiten, supranote 8 at para. 116. According to S.Waddams, aggravated damages attribute legal
significance to "intangible injuries, such as distress and humiliation that may have been caused by the
defendant's insulting behaviour" The Law ofDamages (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1983) at 562-63,
quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in Vorvis, supra note 11 at para. 16. This same
passage is found in the 3rd edition as well (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1997) at 483.
25. Whiten, ibid. at para. 157.
26. Jamie Cassels, Remedies: The Law of Damages (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) at 195.
27. Huff v. Price(1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 282 at para. 51 (C.A.) [Hufi].
28. Per Whiten, supranote 8 at para. 78. For a recent statement from the Ontario Court of Appeal to
this effect, see Lyons v. CanadaLife Assurance Co. (2002), 42 C.C.L.I. (3d) 164 (Ont. C.A.) at para.
II [Lyons].
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actionable wrong is not necessarily onerous given that the Supreme Court
of Canada in Whiten has confirmed that a good faith obligation is distinct
29
from the obligation to honour the contract.
Aggravated damages are rare in the commercial arena if only for one
simple reason. The bulk of the case law suggests that only individual
plaintiffs - as opposed to corporate ones - are entitled to secure such
damages. As Justice Edwards notes in Sunwolf Holdings Ltd. v. Rivers
and Oceans Unlimited Expeditions Inc.:
Since there were no employees of Sunwolf [the plaintiff] present when
McCutcheon took the equipment none can be said to have experienced
"pain, anguish, grief, humiliation, wounded pride" etc. which the
Court of Appeal indicated were factors which might give rise to an
award of aggravated damages. Even if Sunwolf employees had been
so traumatized they are not plaintiffs. I am unaware of any principle
which permits a corporate plaintiff to obtain aggravated damages for
indignities its officers or employees suffer as a result of the conduct of
a defendant.3"
3. Generaldamagesfor mental distress
General damages for mental distress are similar to aggravated damages in
that both seek to compensate for non-pecuniary loss rather than punish the
3
defendant. Furthermore, courts sometimes tend to "blend" these terms. '
However, there is a good argument that these two forms of damages are
distinct because they measure the defendant's conduct from different
perspectives and at different times. 32 One head of damages (i.e., aggravated
damages) assesses the conduct of defendant at the time of breach and
compensates the plaintiff for the additional emotional harm caused by the
defendant's outrageous conduct. Aggravated damages also require that

29. Whiten, supra note 8. See too Craig Brown et al., Insurance Law in Canada looseleaf
(Scarborough: Thomson Canada Ltd., 2002) at 10-26.
30. SunwolfHoldings Ltd. v. Rivers and Oceans Unlimited Expeditions Inc., [1998] B.C.J. No. 2881,
[1998] G.S.T.C. 127 at para. 42 (S.C.). See too the cases cited in footnote 5. Note that the court in
CorporateClassic Caterers v. DynaproSystems Inc. (1997), 33 C.C.E.L. (2d) 58; [1997] B.C.J. No.
2764 observed at para. 55 that "While it is possible that aggravated damages can be awarded to a
corporate plaintiff, it is most common to see them awarded to a personal plaintiff in actions such as
wrongful dismissal."
31. Bruce Feldthusen, "Contract - Punitive Damages - Aggravated Damages- Damages for Mental
Distress in Contract: Vorvis v. Insurance Corporationof British Columbia" (1990) 69 Can. Bar Rev.
169 at 172.
32. For discussion within the context of franchise law, see Shannon O'Byrne, "Breach of Good Faith
in Performance of the Franchise Contract: Punitive Damages and Damages for Intangibles" (2004)
83 Can. Bar Rev. 431. See too Franchising:Latest Legal and Business Strategies (Toronto: Insight
Information Co., 2003).
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the defendant commit an independent actionable wrong.33 The other head
of damages (i.e., general damages for mental distress) assesses the matter
from the perspective of the parties at the time of contract. According to
Harvin Pitch and Ronald Synder, general damages for mental distress will
only be awarded when such damages pass the test for remoteness stated
in Hadley v. Baxendale.3 4 That is, in certain contracts, it is reasonably
foreseeable that should one party breach, the other party will suffer mental
distress. In this way, general damages for mental distress flow from the
fact of breach as opposed to outrageous conduct at the time of breach. By
way of contrast, aggravated damages are appropriate whether or not mental
distress arising from breach was in the parties' reasonable contemplation
at time of contract.35 Remoteness would presumably be assessed taking
into account the circumstances present on date of breach only.3 6 In short,
aggravated damages compensate for humiliation and distress derived from
the "mode of and motive for the defendant's conduct,"37 while general
damages for mental distress are derived from the breach itself. These
distinctions are subtle but meaningful.
The approach suggested here - namely, insisting on the conceptual
difference between aggravated damages and general damages for mental
distress - is not free from controversy. As the British Columbia Court of
Appeal notes in Warringtonv. Great-West Life Assurance Co.:
[i]n Canada, it is problematic to define the relationship between
damages for mental distress and so-called "aggravated damages", and to
differentiate between those and punitive damages. This difficulty seems
to be the result of the intertwining of punitive and aggravated damages in
various judicial and academic pronouncements, even after the two were
authoritatively severed -- in England by the House of Lords in Rookes
v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129 and in Canada by the Supreme Court in
Vorvis, supra. Speaking for the majority in Vorvis, McIntyre, J. first
of all equated damages for mental distress with aggravated damages:
see the reference at p. 1092 to "damages for mental distress, properly
characterized as aggravated damages".
This pronouncement has

sometimes been overlooked in subsequent cases... 3

33. Per Wallace v. United GrainGrowers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701 at para. 73. Note in this paragraph
that the reference to mental distress appears to be treated as synonymous with aggravated damages.
34. Harvin Pitch and Ronald Synder, Damages for Breach of Contract, 2d ed., loose-leaf
(Scarborough: Thomson-Carswell, 1989) at para. 4.3(a).
35. Ibid.
36. This is how aggravated damages are assessed according to employment law, for example. See
Geoffrey England and Roderick Wood, updating authors, Employment Law in Canada,3d ed., vol. 2,
loose-leaf (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at para. 16.51.
37. Bruce Feldthusen and Neil Vidmar, "Recent Developments in the Canadian Law of Punitive
Damages" (1990) 16 Can. Bus. L.J. 241 at 256.
38. Warrington,supra note 3 at para. 16.
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As I have argued elsewhere, while one can understand the appellate court's
desire to follow the terminology espoused by the Supreme Court of Canada
on point, the move to collapse mental distress into aggravated damages is
perhaps problematic since it uses the same term ("aggravated damages")
for two different phenomena.39 In Warrington, for example, the plaintiff
was given aggravated damages for mental distress not because he had
established a separate actionable wrong but because a disability insurance
policy, in the court's words, "is one of the few contracts in which damages
for mental distress are recoverable when they are proven to result from
the breach of contract."40 This suggests that the plaintiff is receiving nonpecuniary damages not because of abusive conduct on breach sounding
in aggravated damages but because - given the kind of contract at issue
- mental distress was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of breach.
Put another way, it was the fact of breach (which founds general damages
for mental distress) not the manner of breach (which founds aggravated
damages) on which the decision focussed.
In order to keep the distinctions clear between these two forms of nonpecuniary loss, this paper will use "aggravated damages" to refer to distress
which arises due to the defendant's behaviour on breach and which must be
accompanied by an independent actionable wrong. It will refer to general
damages for mental distress as damages which are recoverable because,
at the time of contract, they were a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of breach. Whether general damages for mental distress has requirements
beyond reasonable foreseeability is the subject of the next section of this
paper.
II. Exceptions to the rule of no recoveryfor mental distress
Courts have taken three paths to compensate the deserving plaintiff for
mental distress flowing from the defendant's breach, notwithstanding
the general rule against recovery: determine whether the contract is
commercial or non-commercial, permitting recovery only in the latter case;
on a related front, determine whether the contract fits within a category of
exceptions to the general rule such that mental distress damages would
be recoverable; or, thirdly, apply the simple principles of foreseeability
without preliminary regard to the type of contract or its classification.
These strategies have not yet been reconciled by the courts and therefore
make this area of law problematic to summarize.

39.
40.

Supra note 32.
Warrington,supra note 3 at para. 22.
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1. Recovery when the contract is non-commercial
One approach to the question of recovery for non-pecuniary loss is to
ask whether the contract in question is commercial (in which case there
can be no recovery) or non-commercial (in which case there might be).41
According to Justice Deyell in Taylor v. Gill, the rule against recovery for
non-pecuniary loss in a commercial contract seems to:
originate with McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 15th ed. (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1988) at 54, where the learned author states,
consistently with previous editions:
The reason for the general rule is that contracts normally
concern commercial matters and that mental suffering on
breach is not in the contemplation of the parties as part of the
business risk of the transaction. If however the contract is not
primarily a commercial one, in the sense that it affects not the
plaintiff's business interests but his personal, social and family
interests, the door should not be closed to awarding damages
for mental suffering if the court thinks that in the particular
circumstances the parties to the contract had such damage in
their contemplation.4
This distinction between a commercial and a non-commercial contract,
however, is arguably a false one. The following analysis of Justice Deyell
is quoted at length for its clarity:
Consider an example. A consumer purchases a motor vehicle. It is
warranted to be trouble-free, and this is the feature that compels the
purchaser to enter the contract for purchase and sale. The cost is more
than the consumer can afford unless he attributes the money he had
planned to use for repairs toward the purchase price. The salesperson
encourages him to do so. He does so, confident that the car will be
trouble-free. The car requires repairs daily. The purchaser suffers great
emotional distress as a result (assume that the mental distress is not a
direct result of any economic factors, but solely attributable to the breach
of contract). Should we close the door to a claim for mental distress
merely because he purchased the car primarily for employment purposes,
a commercial use, rather than for personal use, a non-commercial use.
That is, the commercial or non-commercial nature of the contract is not
always the deciding factor. On the other hand, where a large corporation
buys a motor vehicle which is not sound, it is difficult to say that the
corporation suffered from mental distress as a result of the breach of
contract. The issue is one of reasonable contemplation and no more. Is
41. See, for example, Brown v. Waterloo Regional Boardof Commissioners of Police (1983), 43
O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.) at 118 wherein Weatherston .A. states: "in the ordinary commercial transaction,
the reasonable expectations of the parties are that the disappointed party will bear himself with a
measure of fortitude, and be satisfied if he can recoup his financial loss."
42. Taylor v. Gill, [1991] 3 W.W.R. 727 (Alta.Q.B.) at 745 [Gill].
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it reasonable to contemplate that the corporation would suffer mental
distress as a result of any breach of contract? This must be answered in
the negative as corporations are incapable of experiencing anguish or any
other sentiment. On the other hand, could it reasonably be contemplated
that a person entering a contract to purchase a motor vehicle will suffer
mental anguish as a result of a series of disappointments relating to a
breach of the contract? I suggest that it can....
Similarly, in the case of real estate contracts which are breached by
the proposed purchaser, the character of the vendor would have to be
considered in order to determine whether the door is open for a claim
of mental suffering. Where the vendor is selling his only home, and the
breach of contract in fact causes mental distress, damages for mental
distress can be argued. Such a claim may be less credible where the
vendor buys and sells a home every few months, making profit as he goes.
Clearly the vendor in such a case has put his mind to the risk of having
a real estate transaction fall apart. The vendor takes a business risk. The
claim would be less credible where a bank is selling homes which were
taken in foreclosures. Would one seriously contemplate that the bank or
the person who sells a home every few months would suffer emotional
distress as a result of the aborted real estate transaction? Probably not.
However, it must be emphasized that this is not based upon whether the
transaction could be characterized as "commercial" or not.43

Dispensing with the distinction between commercial and non-commercial
is probably helpful for two reasons. First, as the court in the above passage
demonstrates, the distinction breaks down under scrutiny.' Second, even
assuming the distinction has some utility, it does not account for all the
current kinds of contracts in which courts have awarded mental distress
damages including: certain kinds of insurance contracts; employment
contracts; and wrongful receiverships. That is, the latter are commercial
contracts but ones for which mental distress damages were nonetheless
awarded.
A closely related approach to classifying the contract as commercial
or non-commercial, is to determine whether the contract in question fits
within an established category of exceptions to the general rule. Such an
approach is the subject of the next section.

43. Ibid. at 745-747.
44. Others have observed the difficulty in distinguishing the commercial from the non-commercial,
including Elizabeth MacDonald, "Contractual Damages for Mental Distress" (1994) 7 J. Contracts
Law 134 at 153 and Andrew Phang, supra note 2 at 353.
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2. Recovery based on contractfitting within an establishedcategory of
exceptions to the generalrule
Even the earliest cases which articulate the rule against recovery for
mental distress recognize exceptions. In the 1865 decision of Hamlin,
for example, the court acknowledged that breach of contract to marry is
an exception to the general rule and accordingly, "injury to the feelings of
the party may be taken into consideration."45 This is because the contract
has a personal quality to it, or, in the words of counsel for the plaintiff,
"a contract affecting the person."46 Other established exceptions included
mental distress consequent on physical inconvenience 47 ; actions against a
banker for wrongfully refusing to honour a cheque48 ; and contracts where,
in the words of Lord Bingham in Watts v. Morrow:
the very object of a contract is to provide pleasure, relaxation, peace of
mind or freedom from molestation.... If the law did not cater for this
exceptional category of case it would be defective...41
Beyond this, it is relevant to note that one of the law lords in Farley v.
Skinner 0 has functionally created a new exception to the general rule.
According to Lord Steyn, mental distress should be recoverable not only
when peace of mind is the very object of the contract, as noted by Lord
Bingham in Watts quoted above, but also when peace of mind is simply an
importantpart of the contract.51 A summary of the case follows because it
illustrates an increasing judicial willingness in England's highest court to
enforce the non-pecuniary content of a contract.
In Farley, the plaintiff was interested in purchasing a countryside
retirement home and therefore hired a surveyor to determine, inter alia,
whether the property was affected by aircraft noise. Unfortunately, the
surveyor conducted himself negligently and in breach of contract when

45.

Supra note I at 1262.

46. Ibid.
47. Hobbs v. London & Southwestern Railway (1875), 10 L.R. Q.B. 111 [Hobbs]. Per Mellor
J at 122: "for the mere inconvenience, such as annoyance and loss of temper, or vexation, or for
being disappointed in a particular thing which you have set your mind upon, without realphysical
inconvenience resulting, you cannot recover damages" [emphasis added].
48. Rolin v. Steward (1854), 14 C.B. 595. As Jamie Cassels points out in Remedies: The Law of
Damages, supra note 26 at 204, however, recovery in such a case could also be justified as pecuniary
loss since there is injury to the plaintiff's business or trade.
49. Watts, supra note 3 at 1445. Watts has been followed in Canada, including by the Supreme
Court of Canada which stated in Wallace, supra note 33 at para. 73, that in the ordinary course,
mental distress will only be awarded where "peace of mind is the very matter contracted for." See too
Turczinski v. Dupont Heating & Air Conditioning, (2004), 246 D.L.R. (4th) 95 at para. 26, leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 581.
50. Farley v. Skinner, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 899 (H.L.) [Farley].
51. Ibid. at para. 24. For discussion of this, see Andrew Bowen, "Watts v.Morrow and the Consumer
Surplus: Farley v. Skinner" [2003] S.L.T. 1.
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he advised the plaintiff that there was no significant aircraft noise. Upon
purchasing the home, the plaintiff determined that the property was very
noisy due to the nearby airport, particularly because the property was near
a navigation beacon.
The House of Lords restored the trial judge's award of general damages
for mental distress, with four of the five judges offering separate reasons
for that outcome.12 Building on Watts, Lord Steyn determined that loss of
intangibles (such as pleasure, relaxation or peace of mind) are recoverable
not just when they are the very object of the contract. It is sufficient if
they are a "major or important object of the contract."53 Put another way,
the contract at bar fell within the "very object of the contract" exception
when an important part of the contract related to pleasure, relaxation or
peace of mind.5
Lord Steyn's decision was particularly influenced by David Capper's
analysis, as follows:
A ruling that intangible interests only qualify for legal protection where
they are the 'very object of the contract' [per Watts] is tantamount to a
ruling that contracts where these interest are merely important, but not
the central object of the contract, are in part unenforceable. It is very
difficult to see what policy objection there can be to parties to a contract
agreeing that these interests are to be protected via contracts where the
central object is something else...55
Farley is a tremendously important development in the English common
law because the House of Lords scrutinized and enforced all the promises
that were contained in the contract at bar, not just some of them. First
and foremost, the defendant's contract was to provide survey services in
relation to the residential property, but the contract contained more than
just that. Part of what the surveyor promised was an intangible interest
- in this case peace of mind that the property in question was suitable to
the plaintiff's aesthetic or personal requirements. When that promise was

52. While the other law lords offered separate judgments, all agreed that the case fell within an
exception to the general rule such that mental distress damages were recoverable. See Bowen, ibid.
And as Andrew Bowen also remarks, at 6: "A close examination of all four speeches in Farley can
make your head spin.....[T]he interplay between the different judicial views could soak up days of
debate on the relevancy of any particular claim."
53. Farley,supra note 50 at para. 24. Note Farleyhas already been noticed, inter alia,by the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Wharton v. Tom Harris Chevrolet Oldsmobile Cadillac Ltd., [2002]
B.C.J. No. 233, 2002 B.C.C.A. 78 [Wharton]. (discussed infra at footnote 74 and surrounding text)
and by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Prinzo v. Baycrest Centrefor Geriatric Care (2002), 60 O.R.
(3d) 474 (C.A.) [Prinzo].
54. Farley,supra note 50 at para. 18
55. Lord Steyn, ibid.at para. 24, quoting David Capper, "Damages for Distress and Disappointment
- The Limits of Watts v. Morrow," supranote 4 at 556.
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breached, and the plaintiff suffered mental distress as a foreseeable result,
there is every argument that the plaintiff is entitled to some recovery. Put
another way, the defendant made significant, non-pecuniary promises.
How can he be taken by surprise when the plaintiff suffers emotional
distress when there is a failure to deliver on those promises?
In restoring the trial judge's award for "discomfort" in the amount of
£ 10,000, Lord Steyn did warn that such a sum was on the higher end of what
would be appropriate and that awards in this area should be "restrained
and modest."56
Andrew Bowen is correct to note that Lord Steyn's judgment in
Farley amounts to a "significant redefining of the exceptional category"
articulated in Watts, and "gives scope for many more claims which, pre57
Farley,would have been viewed as insufficiently central to the contract.
Interestingly, however, Lord Steyn couched his analysis in very traditional
language, insisting that "entitlement to damages for mental distress caused
by a breach of contract is not established by mere foreseeability: the right
to recovery is dependent on the case falling fairly within the principles
governing the special exceptions."58
What follows is a discussion of the special exceptions to the rule of no
recovery for mental distress. It will be seen that through these exceptions,
courts refuse to apply the general rule in a blanket fashion because to do
so would produce an injustice.
a. Establishedcategories or exceptions to the general rule
vacations
One of the most important and well-known decisions in the entire area of
recovery for mental distress is Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd.,5 9 wherein Lord
Denning permitted a sorely disappointed vacationer to recover general
damages for mental distress. In Jarvis, the plaintiff booked his annual
holiday with the defendants but the vacation delivered fell well short
of what was promised. To set the stage for recovery of mental distress
damages, Lord Denning outlined all the problems with the vacation, both
large and small.
While acknowledging the general rule against recovery for mental
distress set forth in Hamlin, Lord Denning also stated that such limitations
were out of date and that in the proper case, mental distress damages were

56. Farley, supra note 50 at para. 28.
57. Andrew Bowen, supra note 51 at 4.
58. Farley, supra note 50 at para. 16.
59. Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd., [1973] 2 Q.B. 233 (C.A.) [Jarvis].
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recoverable. Any contract to provide entertainment and enjoyment would
qualify and accordingly, he awarded the plaintiff £125.
Numerous Canadian cases have followed suit, permitting mental
distress damages to the disappointed vacationer. 60 Additionally, in an
important decision from Australia, the High Court of Justice in Baltic
Shipping v. Dillon affirmed the plaintiff's $5,000 award for mental distress.
Here, the plaintiff had been a passenger on a cruise ship which sank on the
tenth day of a fourteen day vacation. Not only did she receive general
damages for mental distress, she also received, inter alia, additional
61
damages for the "emotional scars" and "psychological trauma" endured.
weddings
In the leading Scottish decision of Diesen v. Samson, the plaintiff bride
sought general damages for mental distress because the photographer
forgot to attend her wedding and take the photographs for which she had
contracted. According to the court, the contract fell into an exceptional
category permitting recovery because it was "exclusively concerned with
the pursuers personal, social, and family interests and with her feelings....
What both the parties obviously had in their contemplation was that the
pursuer would be enable to enjoy such pleasure [from the photographs] in

60. In Fenton v. Sand and Sea Travel Ltd. (1992), 134 A.R. 317 (Prov. Ct.), the court awarded
$1,000 for distress and disappointment when the defendant failed to provide facilities that would
accommodate scooters; in Recchia v. P Lawson Travel, [1990] O.J. No. 2532 (Gen. Div.), the court
awarded $750 for mental distress, physical illness and frustration because the resort did not have the
amenities as promised; in Smith v. Eaton Travel Ltd, [1982] S.J. No. 45 (Q.B.), the court awarded
$1,000 for mental distress, inconvenience, upset, disappointment and frustration because the trip had
been a "disaster" due to the defendant's breach; in Merchant v. Sunquest Vacations Ltd., [1990] O.J.
No. 2531 (Gen. Div.), the plaintiff received $1,500 for loss of enjoyment of two days of the vacation
and resulting anxiety when the travel agent failed to communicate the change in carrier and flight
time; in Pitzel v. Saskatchewan Motor Club TravelAgency Ltd., [1986] S.J. No. 105 (C.A.), the court
of appeal reduced the plaintiff's damages for mental distress for a failed vacation from $5,000 to
$3,000; in Bratty v. Lloyds World Travel Service of CanadaLtd., [ 1984] B.C.J. No. 1569 (C.A.), the
plaintiff received $3,000 damages for mental distress because, though told by the defendant that he
did not need a visa to travel to Czechoslovakia, it turned out that one was required. Upon arriving
in Czechoslovakia, he was placed under armed guard. See too Cameron and Cameron v. Maritime
Travel (Halifax)Ltd., Skylark Holidays Ltd. and Flinn (1983), 58 N.S.R. (2d) 379 (S.C.(T.D.)); Litner
v. Delta ChartersInc., [1997] B.C.J. No. 908 (S.C.); Snucins v. Conquest Tours (Toronto) Ltd. (1990),
74 O.R. (2d) 781 (Div. Ct.); Keks v. Esquire Pleasure Tours Ltd. (c.o.b. PleasureTours (Canada)Ltd),
[1974] 3 W.W.R. 406 (Man. Co. Ct.); and Sokolosky v Canada3000Airlines Ltd. (c.o.b. Canada3000
Holidays), [2002] O.J. No. 3085 (Sup. Ct.).
61. Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon (The Mikhail Lermontov) (1993), 176 C.L.R. 344 at 373
(H.C.A.) [Baltic Shipping]. For academic commentary on this case, see, for example: C.J.F. Kidd,
"The Significance of the High Court Decision in Baltic Shipping Company v. Dillon" (1994) 18 U.
Queensland L. J. 112; D. Kambovski, "Damages for Mental Distress in Contract" (1994) 1 Deakin
L. R. 11; and S. Hetherington, "Passenger's Damages for Disappointment and Distress: The Mikhail
Lermontov" [1993] L.M.C.L.Q. 289.
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the years ahead. '62 As for quantum, the court exercised "moderation" and
"proportion" in awarding £30 for mental distress.
In Wilson v. Sooter Studios Ltd., the British Columbia Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial judge's award of $1,000 for mental distress consequent
upon the defendant's failure to take extensive wedding pictures as
promised.6 3 To do so, it relied on Lord Denning's analysis in Jarvis Tours
and Diesen, discussed above.
By way of contrast, the plaintiff's plea for mental distress damages was
unsuccessful in Baid v. Aliments Rinag Foods Inc. In this case, the plaintiff
hired the defendant caterer for his son's wedding reception. Because the
food arrived five hours late, the plaintiff refused to pay. In addition to
seeking mental distress damages, the plaintiff sought to recover $5,924
for the cost of securing alternate food and drink for his guests. According
to the court, however, the contract was for catering services only and "not
to provide peace of mind or freedom from distress. '64 On a related front,
mental distress was not in the parties' contemplation when they entered
into the contract, though the defendant did know that the event was an
important one. It should be noted, however, that the court was generous
on the pecuniary loss side by allowing the plaintiff to recover the full cost
of mitigation in seeking a replacement caterer and ruling that the plaintiff
should have to pay nothing under the contract with the defendant, even
though the defendant did serve some food at 10 pm. In the court's words,
that food should be at the defendant's cost "as a public relations gesture
towards... [the plaintiff]."6 5
It is difficult to reconcile Baidwith Wilson and related cases.
employment (wrongful dismissal)
Historically, the plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action could not recover
general damages for mental distress absent an independent actionable
wrong. This is due to how the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
62.
63.

Diesen v. Samson, [1971] S.L.T. 49 at 50 [Diesen].
Wilson v. Sooter Studios Ltd. (1988), 33 B.C.L.R. (2d) 241 (C.A.) [Wilson]. In fact, only 10

photographs (out of 120) turned out properly. Note that the court in Wilson did not agree, contrary to
the plaintiff's argument, that the cost of reconstituting the entire wedding party should also be borne
by the defendant. See too Booth v. Saint John, [1988] O.J. No. 2674 (Prov. Ct. (Civ. Div.)) where
the court awarded $750 for mental distress because the photographer failed to attend and Laarakkers
v. Executive House Ltd., [1987] B.C.J. No. 2817 (S.C.) in which the plaintiff bride and groom were
awarded $250 in mental distress for being wrongfully denied a room reserved for them on their
wedding night.
64. Baid v. Aliments Rinag Foods Inc., (2003), 123 A.C.W.S. (3d) 272 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 25 [Baid].
Quaere whether Baid would have been differently decided in light of Farley,supra note 50. Other

unsuccessful cases include Olson v. Beaulieu, [2002] S.J. No. 779 (Prov. Ct.) (defendant altered the
bride's wedding dress in an incompetent manner).
65. Baid, ibid.at para. 23.
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Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia has been interpreted. 66
Accordingly, at least until the Supreme Court of Canada's more recent
decision in Wallace,67 the plaintiff would not recover any compensation
for rough handling by the employer on dismissal when it was less than
independently actionable.
Wallace now accords legal significance to the employee's vulnerability
at the particular moment of job loss. Though, as Mr. Justice lacobucci
observed, "an employment contract is not one in which peace of mind is
the very matter contracted for" 68 (and therefore mental distress damages
could not sound on that basis), there was nonetheless recourse for the
employee:
[A]t a minimum, ... in the course of dismissal employers ought to be

candid, reasonable, honest and forthright with their employees and
should refrain from engaging in conduct that is unfair or is in bad faith
by being, for example, untruthful, misleading or unduly insensitive. 69
The recovery for mental distress suffered by the plaintiff is accomplished
through the remedy of extending the notice period. In this way, the Supreme
Court of Canada compensates for non-pecuniary loss but under another
guise. While there have been serious objections to this approach,7" it does
provide some relief to the plaintiff and does effectively cap the size of the
award, thereby serving some indirect public policy objectives.7
insurance
Mental distress damages can be awarded for breach of a disability
insurance policy because, as already noted, such a contract "is one of the
few contracts in which damages for mental distress are recoverable when

66.

Supra note II. See, for example, Prinzo,supra note 53, and Wallace, supranote 33 at para. 73.

67. Supra note 33.
68. Ibid. at para. 73. Whether this characterization will be revisited in light of Farley, supra note
50, remains an open question. Another ground upon which to revisit Wallace concerns whether the
employment contract contains a term of good faith and fair dealing. The House of Lords in Malik v.
Bank of Credit CommerceInternational,[1997] 3 All E.R. I contends that it does. So does the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Prinzo, supra note 53 at para. 34. For a contrary view, see Babcock v. Canada
(A.G.) (2005), 139 A.C.W.S. (3d) 481 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 210.
69. Wallace, supranote 33 at para. 98.
70. See, for example, Lee Stuesser, "Wrongful Dismissal - Playing Hardball: Wallace v. United
GrainGrowers" (1997-98) 25 Man. L.J. 547; John Swan, "Damages for Wrongful Dismissal: Lessons
from Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd." (1998) Can. Lab. & Emp. L.J. 313; Shannon O'Byrne,
"Bad Faith - Contexts of Employment - Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd." (1998) 77 Can. Bar
Rev. 492; and Jamie Cassells, supra note 26 at 222.
71. Feldthusen, "Punitive Damages in Canada," supra note 7.
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they are proven to result from the breach of contract.""2 This is because
the subject matter of the contract is to provide peace of mind or freedom
from distress and therefore falls within an exceptional category.73 A strong
argument can be made that mental distress damages should be available
in relation to insurance contracts of all kinds since peace of mind is their
inevitable subject matter.
luxury chattels
In Wharton v. Tom Harris Chevrolet Oldsmobile CadillacLtd., the sound
system in the appellant's luxury vehicle failed to function properly
for over two and a half years.74 At trial, the court awarded $5,000 in
non-pecuniary damages for "loss of enjoyment of their luxury vehicle
and for inconvenience."75 According to Justice Levine (Rowles and Smith
JJ.A. concurring) the trial judge was correct in doing so. Furthermore, the
appellate court adopted the analysis in Farley, stating:
where a major or important part of the contract is to give peace of mind,
damages will be awarded if the fruit of the contract is not provided or if
the contrary is instead procured.76
Wharton has recently been followed in Vavra v. VictoriaFordAllianceLtd.,
wherein the court awarded $5,000 to the plaintiff for "frustration, anxiety,
and interference with, and loss of amenity, of her leisure lifestyle."77 In this
case, the deficiently performing vehicle did not have the towing capacity
72. Warrington,supra note 3 at para. 22. Note that in Petersen v. Power, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2998
(S.C.), the court refused to award mental distress damages absent an independent actionable wrong
based on Wallace, supranote 33, but this is likely a misreading of Wallace. In Wallace, the Supreme
Court of Canada recognized that in certain contracts, peace of mind was the very matter contracted for,
at para. 73, but that an employment contract was not one of those contracts. It therefore recognized
that mental distress damages were recoverable even absent an independent actionable wrong. It also
went on to create a special analysis for employment contracts. For discussion of Wallace, see footnote
68 and surrounding text. See too the British Columbia Court of Appeal's analysis in Warrington, in
footnote 38 and surrounding text. Warrington's analysis has been followed by a number of courts,
including: Gerber v. Telus Corp., [2003] 10 W.W.R. 82 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 118, affirmed [2004] 6
W.W.R. 205 (C.A.); Mclsaacv. Sun Life Co. of Canada (c.o.b. Sun Life of Canada)(1999), 173 D.L.R.
(4th) 649 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 14; Wharton, supra note 53 at para. 4; Anderson v. Peters (2000), 152
Man. R. (2d) 113 (Man. Q.B.) at paras 32-33; and Fidlerv. Sunlife Assurance Co. of Canada(2004),
239 D.L.R. (4th) 547 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal granted [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 335.
73. Warrington, ibid. at para. 19 and following. For similar analysis, see Thompson et al. v. Zurich
Insurance Co. (1984), 7 D.L.R. (4th) 664 (Ont. H.C.J.). See Whiten, supra note 8 at para. 129 which
identifies fire insurance policies as peace of mind contracts.
74. Supra note 53.
75. Ibid. at para. 15.
76. Ibid. at para. 57.
77. Vavra v. Victoria FordAlliance Ltd., (2003), 124 A.C.W.S. (3d) 924 (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 58.
Wharton has also recently been followed in a case involving a real estate transaction. See Bontorin
v. Greenway Land Corp. (2004), 25 R.P.R. (4th) 21 (B.C.S.C.) wherein the court awarded $35,000 in
"aggravated damages" but what this paper would call "general damages for mental distress."
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that it was warranted to have, with the defendant unwilling or unable to
78
remedy the problem over a period of two years.
Wharton and Vavra reach the outcomes which are entirely consistent
with what Lord Steyn lays down. That is, in both of the contracts at bar,
peace of mind was not the very thing contracted for but was an important
component in them. On this basis, the plaintiff was entitled to some
compensation for mental distress suffered.
solicitor-client
There would appear to be only one reported case in Canada which expressly
considers whether the solicitor-client contract fits within a special category
permitting recovery for mental distress, namely Maillot v. Murray Lott
Law Corp.79 In this case, the plaintiff sued for general damages for mental
distress and aggravated damages related to breach of a contingency fee
agreement relating to a work-related disability claim against the Workers
Compensation Board. The defendant counterclaimed for payment of
fees on a quantum meruit basis. The court agreed that the defendant had
wrongfully repudiated the contingency agreement and that therefore no
fees were payable at all by the client. As for intangible damages, the court
was left in somewhat of a quandary because the plaintiff abandoned his
claim for mental distress at the discovery stage and had only pressed the
claim for aggravated damages. In response, the court stated:
While I am not persuaded that a claim for damages for mental distress
and a claim for aggravated damages necessarily constitute overlapping
claims, it is nevertheless the case that there is no compelling evidence to
establish that the specific object of the contingency fee agreement was
to ensure Maillot's peace of mind or to free him from mental or financial
anxiety. Accordingly, I find there is no foundation for any award of
aggravated damages."
In reaching this decision, the court relied on both Farley and Warrington
but it could be argued that the court is asking more of the contract than
certainly Farley did. Recall that in Farley, the contract in question was

78. Vavra at para 61. Note in Chambers v. Ryan Warranty Services, (2003), A.C.W.S. (3d) 355 (Ont.
Sup. Ct.), affirmed [2004] O.J. No. 5360 (Sup. Ct.), the trial judge refised to award mental distress
damages on a consumer product warranty contract on the basis that the plaintiff had damaged his own
vehicle by driving it when it was overheated, thereby causing his own loss. Furthermore, even if the
defendants were liable for the loss, damages for mental distress would not be recoverable because a
consumer product warranty "does not fall within the category of cases where 'peace of mind' is the
very matter contracted for between the parties" at para. 47. Note, however, that Farley,supra note 50,
is not mentioned in the decision and may not have been argued in that case.
79. Maillot v. Murray Lott Law Corp. (2002), 99 B.C.L.R. (3d) 170 [Maillot].
80. Ibid. at para. 92.
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to provide a survey report. The requested information on aircraft noise
and the implied peace of mind the surveyor was implicitly promising in
relation to that was merely an "important" part of the contract. In this
context, perhaps the plaintiff's evidence in Maillot might have attracted a
more sympathetic ear given that the defendant wrongfully terminated the
contingency fee agreement in the plaintiff's moment of need.
Two recent appellate cases have awarded mental distress damages
to the disappointed client in similar circumstances. In the 2000 decision
of Boudreau v. Benaiah,81 the Ontario Court of Appeal did not disallow
- but merely reduced - the plaintiff's award for mental distress damages
arising out of her lawyer's incompetence in conducting his defense in a
criminal matter. The trial judge had awarded $30,000 under this head
but the Court of Appeal lowered the quantum to $15,000 because not all
of the distress which the plaintiff endured was caused by the defendant's
negligence. Note that while the plaintiff sued in both contract and tort, the
court resolved the dispute on the basis of negligence law alone.
In Hagblom v. Henderson,8 2 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
expanded recovery for mental distress beyond the criminal prosecution
in Benaiah to a civil matter. In Hagblom, the plaintiff (Mr. Hagblom)
had originally been sued by a customer for allegedly installing a chimney
improperly. Because Hagblom's counsel put in a negligent defence,
Hagblom lost a potentially winnable case, which the Court of Appeal fixed
at a 75% chance of success.
As a result of losing his case against the customer, the plaintiff suffered
distress because, inter alia, people in the community would think he was
a poorly skilled mason. In the words of Jackson J.A.,... "it is clear that he
[Hagblom] was deeply affected by the loss and by the representation that
he had received."83 Accordingly, the court awarded 75% of his claim of
$15,000 as general damages for mental distress.
Given that defendant's counsel took no issue with the plaintiff's right
to claim mental distress damages, Jackson J.A. was not required to analyse
this area of law, instead referencing in support Professor Waddams' text
The Law of Damages.84 For this reason, one cannot know the precise
grounds upon which the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
81. Boudreau v. Benaiah (2000), 46 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.) [Benaiah]. See too Tannereye Ltd. v.
Hansen (2001), 201 Nfld. & PE.I. R. 31, [2001] P.E.I.J. No. 58 at para. 366 where the court awards
general damages for stress and anxiety due to the defendants' negligence in providing an accounting
service.
82. Henderson v. Hagblom, [2003] 7 W.W.R. 590 (Sask. C.A.) [Hagblom]; leave to appeal
dismissed.
83. Ibid. at para. 235.
84. In her footnote 259, Jackson J.A. cites S.M. Waddams, The Law of Damages, supra note 24 at
3.130 to 3.1450.
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Indeed, Waddams discusses in the pages cited case law based on the
special categories approach and cases which permit recovery based on
reasonable foreseeability - a competing approach that is discussed infra.
To the extent that the plaintiff's claim qualified under either approach,
there was no need to choose in any event.
b. Objections to the categories approach
In deploying the categories approach, courts are consciously erecting
barriers to stave off a flood-gate of inflated claims, trivial complaints,
and allegations of mental distress that are entirely fictitious.85 But as
Edward Veitch remarks, "once intangible harm has been accepted as
an independent compensable harm there can be no logical restriction
on the kind of situations in which it will be recognized. 8 6 On a related
front, Justice Deyell comments on the conceptual incongruity of asking
a plaintiff to show more than just that mental distress damages were a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of breach:
To the extent that the law requires something more than a result within
the reasonable contemplation of the parties, it is inconsistent with
the general rule [of contracts]. The general rule is that damages for
pecuniary losses are available because they are within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties. Damages for mental distress are generally
not available because they are not within the reasonable contemplation
of the parties. Where it is shown that mental distress was within the
reasonable contemplation of the parties, damages should be available.87
Cases explored in the following section take the tack advocated by Justice
5
Deyell and simply deploy Hadley."

3. Recovery based onforeseeabilityalone
a. Currentlaw
One of the most important and earliest instances of a court permitting
recovery for mental distress based on foreseeability is the well-known
decision of Newell v. Canadian Airlines Ltd.8 9 In Newell, the plaintiffs'
dogs were entrusted to the airline for safe passage to Mexico. Upon
arrival, one dog was dead and the other comatose because they had been
packed beside dry ice for the whole journey. The plaintiffs were beside
themselves. As the court observes, for the next forty-eight hours, "the
85. For an excellent account and rebuttal of the policy objections to awarding damages for mental
distress, see Nelson Enonchong, "Breach of Contract and Damages for Mental Distress" (1996) 16
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 617 at 628.
86. Veitch, supra note 2 at 236.
87. Gill, supra note 42 at para. 42.
88. Supra note 6.
89. Newell et al. v. CanadianPacific Airlines, Ltd. (1977), 14 O.R. (2d) 752 (Co. Ct.) [Newell].
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plaintiffs took turns administering oxygen to Patachou [the dog which
arrived alive, but barely] and it would appear that this saved his life." 9°
Though Judge Borins referred to Lord Denning's decision inJarvisand
related case law, the ratio of Borins J.'s decision is based on the principles
of foreseeability. The court stated:
To return to the facts of the case before me the question that must be asked
is this: Was the contract such that the parties must have contemplated that
its breach might entail mental distress, such as frustration, annoyance or
disappointment? I would answer the question in the affirmative. The
contract was to safely carry the plaintiff's pet dogs from Toronto to
Mexico City. On the evidence it is abundantly clear that the defendant
was aware of the plaintiffs' concern for the welfare of their pets....I find
that the contract was such that the plaintiffs and the defendant must have
contemplated that if injury or death were to befall the dogs this might
result in the plaintiffs suffering mental distress. The plaintiffs are
therefore entitled to recover general damages in the sum of $500.9'
Following Newell, there have been multiple instances ofthe courts awarding
mental distress damages based on foreseeability alone. See, for example,
the Alberta Court of Appeal in Kempling v. HearthstoneManor Corp.92 In
this case, the husband and wife respondents sought damages - including
damages for mental suffering - when the appellants wrongfully terminated
their contract for a condominium purchase in Calgary. As was known to
the vendors, the condo was to have been a home for the respondents as
well as for the wife's elderly father. Delays in approval, cost-overruns,
and construction delays which plagued the project also greatly upset the
respondents and the father. The appellant's wrongful repudiation was
simply the ultimate installment.
At trial, the court awarded, inter alia, damages for mental distress
because the defendant caused the plaintiffs a great deal of upheaval and
treated them "very shabbily." 93
A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's award
not on the basis of a "special categories" analysis but simply on the basis
of foreseeability. According to Madam Justice Picard (Harradence J.A.
concurring with respect to the matter of damages):
90. Ibid.at para. 4. Cases involving animals which have followed Newell include Weinberg v. Connors
(1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 62 (Gen. Div.) (where defendant was in breach of contract for failing to keep
plaintiff aware of location of adopted cat. Court awarded $1,000 in general damages ) and Surette v.
Kingsley (c.o.b. Pawfor Thoughts!), [2000] N.B.J. No. 532. (Sm. Cl. Ct.) (where cat was injured by
an incompetent groomer employed by the defendant. Court awarded $250 general damages).
91. Newell, supra note 89 at para. 39.
92. Kempling v. HearthstoneManor Corp. (1996), 137 D.L.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. C.A.) [Kempling],
cited with approval by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Turczinski, supranote 49.
93. Kemplingv. HearthstoneManor Corp. (1992) 136A.R. 339 (Q.B.).
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Justice Wilson [dissenting in Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British
Columbia, (1989] 2 S.C.R. 1085] found a "common denominator" in
the cases where damages [for mental distress] were awarded, that being
that the parties should reasonably have foreseen mental suffering as a
consequence of a breach of contract at the time the contract was entered
into. She concluded at p. 301:
"It is my view, that the established principles of contract law
set out in Hadley v. Baxendale provide the proper test for the
recovery of damages for mental suffering. The principles are
well-settled and their broad application would appear preferable
to decision-making based on a priori and inflexible categories
of damage. The issue in assessing damages is not whether the
plaintiff got what he bargained for, i.e. pleasure or peace of mind
(although this is obviously relevant to whether or not there was
a breach), but whether he should be compensated for damage
the defendant should reasonably have anticipated that he would
suffer as a consequence of the breach."94

Justice Picard went on to observe that there was no need to fear opening
of the floodgates because the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale "has within it
the means to test and limit liability."95 She agreed that there were special
circumstances communicated to the respondent (including that the condo
was being purchased to house the respondent's elderly father) and that
mental distress damages were reasonably foreseeable. 96 The judge's
quantum of general damages of $7,500 was affirmed.
A review of the case law reveals numerous other examples where
courts have awarded general damages for mental distress based on simple
foreseeability in a failed contract for the purchase and sale ofresidential real

94.

Supra note 92 at para. 67.

95. Ibid. at para. 69.
96. Ibid. at para. 17. While Justice Picard is correct to note that mental suffering is most likely to
be established based on the second arm of Hadley, it would seem logical that a claim could also be
established under the first - as, for example, vacation contracts.
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estate or failed home repair.97 The foreseeability approach has been applied
in other kinds of contracts as well. In the 1996 Ontario Superior Court
decision of Mason v. Westside Cemeteries Ltd., for example, the plaintiff

sued the defendant for breach of a bailment contract (or alternatively, in
negligence) because the defendant lost the ashes of his deceased parents.
Not surprisingly, the plaintiff also sought general damages for mental
distress. Justice Molloy awarded $1,000 under this heading because it
must have been contemplated that the loss of the ashes would cause the

plaintiff mental distress. As the court succinctly summarizes the matter:
"If damages are recoverable for upset over the loss of a dog [as in Newell]
or for the disappointment of a ruined holiday [as in Jarvis], surely the
distress caused by the loss of the remains of someone's deceased parents
is likewise compensable."98
Not all claims assessed under the Hadley approach are successful,
of course. In Cunningham v. Dowling General Construction Ltd., the
court agreed that there had been an improvident sale by the mortgagee

97. See, for example: Stoddard v. Atwil Enterprises Ltd. (1991), 105 N.S.R. (2d) 315 (S.C.(T.D.)),
supplementary reasons for judgment at [1991] N.S.J. No. 686, in which the plaintiff was awarded
$3,000 for mental distress by Justice Saunders; Shillingford v. Dalbridge Group Inc., [1996] A.J. No.
1063 (Q.B.) at para. 33, wherein Justice Perras awarded mental distress damages against some corporate
directors in a breach of contract action in the amount of $6,000; Cudmore v. Home Chec CanadaLtd.,
[2001] 3 W.W.R. 541 (Man. Q.B.) at para. 50 where Justice Schwartz awarded the plaintiff $5,000
for "anxiety, stress, emotional disturbance and inconvenience" due to the defendant's abject failure
to complete home repairs; Page v. Russell (2001), 305 A.R. 352 (Q.B.) at para. 39 wherein Justice
Gallant awarded the plaintiffs $1,000 for their "unhappiness, frustration, inconvenience and anger" as
a result of defendant's construction delays; Gill supra note 42, wherein Justice Deyell awarded the
plaintiffs $7,500 for mental suffering arising from the breach of contract for the sale of a house and
Gourlay v. Osmond (1991), 104 N.S.R. (2d) 155 (S.C.(T.D.)) where $5,000 was awarded for mental
distress arising from another failed real estate transaction. Note that in Gourlay,the full extent of the
male plaintiff's mental distress - including upset at having to miss his brother's wedding in Scotland
- was not recoverable because it was too remote.
For a contrary result, see Turczinski, supra note 49. At trial, the court awarded the plaintiff
$35,000 for mental distress in a breach of contract action based on foreseeability. That is, Dupont
knew that Turczinski suffered from an obvious and long-standing mental disorder and that breach of
contract would worsen her condition beyond the extent of the pecuniary loss, at paras. 175-176. On
appeal, the court reversed, inter alia, based on a lack of foreseeability, at para. 37. The appellate
court said that clearer evidence was needed that the contracting parties were specifically aware of the
potential for significant mental distress, at para. 40.
Note, finally, that there is a smaller line of authority suggesting that recovery for mental distress
related to failed construction contracts and associated matters can proceed by way of the "special
categories" approach of Jarvis, supra note 59. See Novak v. Poiler (1985), 12 C.L.R. 295 (Ont. Dist.
Ct.) at para. 10 and following. See too Tucci v. City Concepts ConstructionLtd. (2000), 2 C.L.R. (3d)
291 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Jus.) which awards $15,000 in mental distress damages based on Novak. As a final
example, see Johnston & Associates Ltd. v. Wade [1994] O.J. No. 662 (Gen. Div.) at para. 15, which
relies on Novak to award $10,000 in mental distress.
98. Mason v. Westside Cemeteries Ltd. (1996), 135 D.L.R. (4th) 361 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [Mason] at
para. 53. See too McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc., (2004), 36 C.C.L.T. (3d) 158 (Ont.
Sup. Ct. Jus.).
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but disallowed the mortgagor's claim for mental distress based on lack of
foreseeability and lack of causation.99
The approach in the foregoing cases is persuasive since the courts are
able to limit recoverability while doing justice to the deserving plaintiff.
Instead of applying "a priori and inflexible categories of damages,"' 0
the court taps into the gate-keeping capacity of ordinary remoteness
principles. It is an approach which resonates with simplicity particularly
when compared to the category-based perspective outlined in the preceding
section. As Thomas J. for the New Zealand High Court stated in Rowlands
v. Collow:
limiting damages for mental distress to certain classes of case when the
damages would otherwise come within the general principles applicable
to damages in contract is both unnecessary and unwise. Rather, the
question of whether or not such damages are recoverable should be
resolved in terms of the test of remoteness as it might be articulated at
any given time.' 0°
b. Objections to the foreseeablity approach
At least one commentator, referenced below, has criticized the foreseeability
approach discussed above on the basis that the courts may well end up
applying pro forma special restrictions under another guise. But this is
not so much a critique of the rule as of the court's possible application of
it. For example, in Vorvis, Wilson J. assessed whether the plaintiff should
recover general damages for mental distress because he had received
exceedingly poor treatment by the employer in the time leading up to
dismissal. Wilson J. applied Hadley v. Baxendale, but still found against
the plaintiff on this point, concluding that mental distress damages were
too remote. Had there been facts outside the ordinary circumstances - such
as a promise of promotion or special elements of trust - the outcome may
02 In response to this analysis
have been different, observed Wilson J.1
Elizabeth MacDonald observes:
it can be argued that mental distress is unlikely to be too remote in relation
to any wrongful dismissal and certainly not in relation to one in which
the employee had received the type of criticism which had occurred
99. Cunningham v. Dowling General Construction Ltd. (1996), 4 O.T.C. 139.
100. Wilson J.(dissenting) in Vorvis, supra note II at para. 46, quoted with approval in Kempling,
supra note 92 at para. 67.
101. Rowlands v. Callow, [19921 1 N.Z.L.R. 178 at 207. Andrew Phang, supra note 2, also supports
recovery for mental distress based on foreseeability. He notes at 373: "[w]hilst it is true that damages
for mental distress would (as we have already seen) probably be too remote in a purely commercial
context, this does not logically entail a blanket prohibition against the award of such damages without
more."
102. Vorvis, supra note II at para. 49.
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in the instant case. In other words, it is arguable that this was not a
factual application of the remoteness test.... In effect, Wilson J was not
advocating that damages for mental distress should be available without
special restriction. Rather it may be that a special restriction was being
imposed behind the remoteness rule. 103
Of course, it is not problematic that courts search out for special features
upon which to attach general damages for mental distress. This is
nothing more than Hadley v. Baxendale instructs us to do under its
second arm. Provided that special features are not transformed into
absolute pre-conditions (which admittedly, Wilson J. seems to insist
upon), the foreseeability approach is distinct from and preferable to the
special categories approach already discussed because it is not artificially
constrained.
Another concern about the foreseeability approach relates to floodgates
- a matter already alluded to in this paper. The worry is that if there is
no initial gatekeeper as to what kind of contract will sound in general
damages for mental distress - if it is all simply a question of reasonably
foreseeability - the courts will be over-run.
In fact, the floodgates concern was what prevailed upon Chief Justice
Mason of the Australian High Court in the Baltic Shipping"° case. The
chief justice did show an initial willingness to reconsider the general rule
against recovery from the ground up - as in the following quotation - but
he ultimately retreated:
[O]ne might ask why the injured party [to a contract] should be deemed
to take the risk of damage of a particular kind when the fundamental
principle on which damages are awarded at common law is that the injured
party is to be restored to the position (not merely the financial position)
in which the party would have been had the actionable wrong not have
taken place. Add to that the fact that anxiety and injured feelings are
recognized as heads of compensable damage, at least outside the realm
of the law of contract. Add as well the circumstance that the general rule
has been undermined by the exceptions which have been engrafted upon
it. We are then left with a rule which rests on flimsy policy foundations
and conceptually is at odds with the fundamental principle governing the
recovery of damages, the more so now that the approaches in tort and
contract are converging." 5

103. Supra note 44 at 154. Note that in light of the recent decision in Wallace, there is no doubt that
the plaintiff in Vorvis would now be compensated for mental distress by an increase in the notice
period.
104. Supra note 61.
105. Ibid. at 362.
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This said, Mason C.J. felt he had no choice in the end but to endorse the
traditional categories approach:
as a matter of ordinary experience, it is evident that, while the innocent
party to a contract will generally be disappointed if the defendant does
not perform the contract, the innocent party's disappointment and distress
are seldom so significant as to attract an award of damages on that score.
For that reason, if no other, it is preferable to adopt the rule that damages
for disappointment and distress are not recoverable unless they proceed
from physical inconvenience caused by the breach or unless the contract
is one the object of0 which
is to provide enjoyment, relaxation or freedom
6
from molestation.
As Elizabeth MacDonald points out, however, Justice Mason seems to
assume "some underlying reason why it is not better simply to comply with
basic principles and allow there to be nominal awards of damages in those
cases where the mental distress was not 'significant." ' 0 7 That is, if the
plaintiff's mental distress is minimal, the court can simply award a small
amount under this head or no damages at all. On this footing, there is no
need for the court to take shelter behind the protection ostensibly afforded
by the special categories approach. Ordinary contract law principles will
provide the tried and true gate-keeper.
Though the foreseeability approach has the very important strength
of avoiding inflexible categories, it arguably presents a potential difficulty
of its own. Courts must be careful not to collapse an important first step
in contractual analysis - namely, determining what was promised by the
contract - into the foreseeability test alone. In Newell, for example, the
defendant agreed to go ahead and enter into a contract for the transport
of the plaintiff's animals knowing full well that the plaintiffs' special
circumstances made competent performance absolutely essential. It could
be argued that, on this basis, the defendant was implicitly promising peace
of mind to the plaintiffs. Hadley would then assess whether the plaintiff's
emotional reaction in face of breach was reasonably foreseeable or not. In
short, Hadley would not be used to determine the content of the contract
but only whether the consequences of breach of that content should be
recoverable or not.
While the foregoing analysis is advancing an admittedly subtle
distinction (which in many cases may lead to no difference in the outcome
of the case), it may be preferable nonetheless. In this case, courts can

106. Ibid. at 365.
107. MacDonald, supra note 44 at 149. See too K.B. Soh, "Anguish, Foreseeability and Policy"
(1989) 105 L.Q.R. 43 at 45 who states: "small claims for mental distress will probably not be made
and the ones that are can be dispatched by nominal damages."
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systematically revisit contract law's classical presumption that contractual
terms relate to pecuniary loss only. By assessing the contract for its nonpecuniary content as an initial step, the court ensures that the defendant is
held to his or her full bargain, whatever that might be.
Regardless of the approach a court takes to the question of mental
distress recovery, there are some constants as the following section
illustrates.
III. Over-archingrules regardlessof approach
1. Corporateplaintiffs cannot recover
As already noted, when a plaintiff is a corporation, it cannot receive
damages based on distress and humiliation. 108 A corporation cannot
experience human emotions and therefore is not entitled to recovery for
damages for non-pecuniary loss. 109
2. Plaintiffmust prove that distress is more thanfleeting
The introduction to this paper referenced David Capper's view that judicial
reticence to permit recovery for intangible losses is partly justifiable
because claimants may artificially inflate their damages and allege "all
kinds of minor losses to which they are largely indifferent.""' This
concern, however, goes to the question of proof of damages and can be
tackled by the court directly."' In short, the plaintiff must prove his case
on the balance of probabilities, including the general damages claim. If the
plaintiff fails to do so - or if quantum is negligible - the claim under this
head of damages must be denied.
Though medical proof of mental distress would likely function to
increase quantum, most courts do not require such evidence before mental
distress damages are available in a breach of contract situation. Courts
tend to be content to weigh the plaintiff's testimony on the emotional
repercussions of breach and set quantum accordingly. In Stoddard v.
108. See cases cited in footnotes 5 and 30. For an American case to the contrary, see Smith v. Hoyer,
697 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1984) wherein both the individual and corporate plaintiff were awarded damages
for mental distress for the bank's conduct in foreclosing on properties after agreeing not to. Note,
however, that the determination of mental anguish was based entirely on the individual plaintiff's
symptoms, at 765. Note that even corporations can recover for loss of business reputation. See, for
example, Ascot Holdings Ltd v. Wilkie (1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) 188 (B.C.S.C.).
109. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider whether the principals behind the plaintiff
corporation may be so entitled. For a discussion of this possibility in relation to franchise law,
see Shannon O'Byrne, "Breach of Good Faith in Performance of the Franchise Contract: Punitive
Damages and Damages for Intangibles," supranote 32.
110. Supra note 4.
111. A.S. Burrows, "Mental Distress Damages in Contract-A Decade of Change" (1984) L.M.C.L.Q.
119 at 133 notes: "as regards the problems of bogus claims, surely the courts are competent to judge
whether the plaintiff has satisfied the burden of proving that he has suffered the mental distress
alleged."
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Atwil Enterprises Ltd., for example, damages were available because the
plaintiffs' stress was real and continuous. 1 2 In Gill, there was proof of the
plaintiff's suffering, in the court's words "as attested to by herself and Mr.
Taylor, in that she was too ill to attend work on a number of occasions.
She broke out in hives and she experienced facial swelling.""' 3 In Page
v. Russell, it was sufficient that the plaintiffs experienced "unhappiness,
frustration, inconvenience and anger" to secure general damages for
mental distress.

114

In Mason, the Ontario Superior Court awarded general damages for
mental distress based on the plaintiff's testimony that he had experienced
considerable emotional upset due to defendant's negligence and breach
of contract in losing the parents' ashes. The court noted that evidence
of psychiatric illness should not be required to found the claim even if
the matter proceeded in tort - an area of law where such a strict form of
evidence is classically required. As the court observed:
In tort cases, courts have for the most part refused to award damages
for emotional upset unless this has caused physical symptoms or some
recognizable psychiatric illness. It has repeatedly been said that grief
alone is not compensable in damages.... It is difficult to rationalize
awarding damages for physical scratches and bruises of a minor nature
but refusing damages for deep emotional distress which falls short of a
psychiatric condition. Trivial physical injury attracts trivial damages.
It would seem logical to deal with trivial emotional injury on the same
basis, rather than by denying the claim altogether. Judges and juries are
routinely required to fix monetary damages based on pain and suffering
even though it is well known that the degree of pain is a subjective thing
incapable of concrete measurement. It is recognized that emotional pain
is just as real as physical pain and may, indeed, be more debilitating. I
cannot see any reason to deny compensation for the emotional pain of a
person who, although suffering, does not degenerate emotionally to the
point of actual psychiatric illness. Surely emotional distress is a more
foreseeable result from a negligent act than is a psychiatric illness....
But what is the logical difference between a scar on the flesh and a scar on the
mind? If a scar on the flesh is compensable although it causes no pecuniary
loss why should a scar on the mind be any less compensable? "5
Perhaps exceptionally, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in Trim v. Beaudet,
required proof of more substantial emotional distress, stating that there
must "be compelling evidence of mental suffering having been inflicted

112.
113.
114.
115.

Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
Supra note

97.
42 at para. 59.
97 at para. 39.
98 at para. 54.
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beyond mere upset and frustration, having medical repercussions of some
degree."" 6
3. Difficulty in assessing quantum no reason to deny the plaintiffa
remedy
While assessing quantum for mental distress can be challenging, Justice
Deyell points out that this is also the case in other more established areas
of law.
When a person suffers from a broken arm as a result of another's conduct,
we offer monetary compensation. We do not expect the plaintiff in such
a case to go to the market and purchase an arm that is in proper working
order. Rather, we place a certain monetary value on a broken arm (general
damages) and thereby attempt to compensate the plaintiff with money
to the extent that money will compensate for the harm....Similarly, we
must put a value on mental health.... As in the case of a broken arm,
we must place a value on mental distress where it is found to exist in
breach of contract cases and we must compensate the plaintiff to the
extent that money could do so. To do otherwise would be inconsistent
with the guiding rule that we must compensate the plaintiff to the extent
that money could compensate for the plaintiff's losses resulting from the
breach of contract.. .[T]he mere difficulty of the task is not a reason for
the Court to deny justice where it is due." 7

4. Quantum must be restrainedand modest
As Justice Molloy observes in Mason, "the general theme is that damages
for mental distress, when allowed, have been relatively low."" 8 Indeed,
in all the Canadian cases surveyed in this paper, the award for intangibles
has rarely exceeded $5,000.119 In Farley,a considerable sum was awarded
(f10,000) but, as already noted, with the admonition that awards in this

116. Trim v. Beaudet, (2003), 127 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1018 (S.C.), 2003 NSSC 216 at para. 40.
117. Gill, supra note 42 at 748-749. For discussion and rebuttal of problems of proof and assessment
in mental distress, see Andrew Phang, "The Crumbling Edifice? - The Award of Contractual Damages
for Mental Distress," supra note 2 at 349.
118. Supra note 98 at para. 58. Note Phang's analysis of large quantum concerns: "the legal culture
of most Commonwealth jurisdictions is such that the award of excessive damages [for mental distress]
is likely to be the exception rather than the rule, if it happens at all." See Phang, supra note 2 at
350, quoting his article "Subjectivity, Objectivity and Policy - Contractual Damages in the House of
Lords" (1996) J. Bus. L. 362 at 375.
119. But see for example: Hagblom, supra note 82 (where the court awarded 75% of the general
damages of $15 000, as additional damages for mental distress); Bontorin, supra note 77 (where
court awarded $35,000); Benaiah, supra note 81 (where trial judgment of $30,000 for mental distress
was reduced to $15,000 upon appeal); Kempling, supra note 92 ($7500 awarded for mental distress);
Shillingford, supra note 97 ($6000 awarded). Note too that awards in cases involving disability
insurance policies range from $10,000 to $20,000 on average per Asselstine v. Manufacturers Life
Insurance, [2005] B.C.J. No. 1152, 2005 BCCA 292 (C.A.) at para. 18. The C.A. went on to affirm an
award of $35,000 as it was not inordinately high, at para. 20. As well, Wallace damages often exceed
$5,000.
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area "should be restrained and modest." According to Lord Steyn, "[i]t is
important that logical and beneficial developments in this corner of the law
should not contribute to the creation of a society bent on litigation."' 20
Due to the Supreme Court's trilogy of cases on personal injury
damages,' 2 ' courts have maintained strict limits on recovery for pain and
suffering in torts. This same attitude of restraint is also evident in assessing
non-pecuniary damages in the contractual arena, as a review of the case
law has shown.12 Note too that if recovery under this head of damage
remains modest, it is also a reply, as Enonchong points out, to the criticism
that permitting mental distress recovery will increase the cost of entering
23

into contracts. 1

IV. Critique of the general rule againstrecoveryfor mental distress
damages
It is an informing principle of contract law that the defaulting party is
liable for loss within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at time
of contract. In addition to serving a gate-keeper function, the general
rule against recovery for mental distress damages is consistent with this
principle but only because it is based on the premise, in Justice Deyell's
words, that "contracts normally concern commercial matters and that
mental suffering on breach is not in the contemplation of the parties as
part of the business risk of the transaction."' 2 4 In this sense, the general
rule against recovery presupposes a certain kind of contract as the norm
or paradigm. More specifically, the general rule against recovery must
assume a contract whose subject matter is fungible, devoid of nonpecuniary content, and the breach of which can be mitigated. In short, if
"B" fails to deliver widgets to "A", in breach of her contract to do so, "A"
is simply required to secure replacement widgets in the market-place and
sue "B" for the difference in price. At this point, "A"has been made whole.
The general rule against recovery reflects the fact that in such an example,
any disappointment suffered by "A" would be small (and therefore, of no
concern to the law under the de minimis principle) or, if substantial, then
unforeseeable under the Hadley v. Baxendale principle. On this basis, and
at least at a theoretical level, the general rule has utility and is consistent
with overall contract law principles.
120. Supra note 50 at para. 28.
121. Andrews v. Grand& ToyAlberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229; Thornton v. School DistrictNo. 57,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 267; and Arnoldv. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 287.
122. Edward Veitch observed this same modesty in quantum in an article published over twenty-five
years ago. See Veitch, supra note 2 at 240.
123. Supra note 85 at 631.
124. McGregor, McGregoron Damages, 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1988) at 54, as quoted
in Gill, supra note 42 at 745.
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But how descriptively robust is the generic "widget" contract outlined
above and the conclusions that flow from it? There are many contracts, as
discussed in this paper, which contain important, non-pecuniary assurances.
And, in further opposition to the assumptions informing the generic
contract, these are precisely the kind of contracts which are not subject to
mitigation. Mrs. Newell's little dog is dead and that cannot be changed;
Mr. Jarvis's annual vacation is over and he has to wait another year before
he can take a holiday again; the photographer has failed to turn up at Ms.
Wilson's wedding and that moment can never be recaptured; the cemetery
has lost the ashes of Mr. Mason's parents and there is absolutely nothing
the plaintiff can do about that now; Mr. Wallace has been humiliated and
derided by his employers - the marketplace cannot undo that devastating
experience; and Mr. Warrington's disability insurance policy was not
honoured by the insurer at the time he needed it most but he could not
mitigate by purchasing a replacement policy - he was already disabled
at that point. In such circumstances, as Michael Bridge observes, mental
distress is not merely a "possible consequence of a breach of contract by
the defendant but the very kind of consequence that a breach of contract
was likely to bring about." '25
The difficulty with the general rule is that it assumes that the generic
contract contains only pecuniary content. It then tautologically declares
- as a general rule - that non-pecuniary loss is unforeseeable or not part
of the risk assumed by the defendant. As Mr. Justice Weatherston points
out in Brown, "[t]here may be a measure of policy in denying damages
for mental distress in cases when there is nothing more than pecuniary
loss. But I think this is not so much an exception to the rule in Hadley v.
'1 26
Baxendale as a practical application of it."

As this paper has illustrated, under the "categories" approach
to recovery of mental distress damages, the plaintiff must not only
show that non-pecuniary damages are reasonably foreseeable. The
plaintiff must show "something more" - namely that the contract fits
with an established exception to the general rule. In this way, fear of
floodgates is kept in check but in a way that needlessly compromises
ordinary contract law principles. As Justice Molloy observes in Mason,
It is important in our society that all citizens have access to our courts of
civil justice to redress wrongs committed against them. That does not
mean that a civil action for damages is the appropriate solution to every
instance of emotional upset or hurt feelings caused by somebody else's
125. Michael Bridge, "Contractual Damages for Intangible Loss: A Comparative Analysis" (1984)62
Can. Bar Rev. 323 at 370.
126. Brown, supranote 41 at 118.
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civil wrong. While those claims may, on the application of general legal
principles, be valid, if the injury suffered is trivial in nature the damages
awarded should reflect that fact.'27
Though ostensibly following a special categories approach, Lord Steyn's
analysis in Farley is broad and makes room for non-pecuniary claims in a
much more generalized way than earlier case law did. It asks the court to
scrutinize the contract and measure its non-pecuniary content. Provided
that non-pecuniary content is major or important, breach of that content
will sound in damages for mental distress. When non-pecuniary content
is a significant part of what has been promised, non-pecuniary loss is
almost certainly reasonably foreseeable. There is no injustice done to
the defendant nor has it been taken by surprise. The defendant is simply
being held to its contract. In this way, Lord Steyn's analysis accords with
the reasonable foreseeability approach espoused by several courts across
Canada.
If the foreseeability approach discussed earlier offers a demonstrably
palatable and fair approach to breach of contract claims sounding in
non-pecuniary loss, there is no requirement for a general rule against
recovery for intangibles. Indeed, the general rule has probably needlessly
complicated the common law by spawning a category-based group of
exceptions. Though the policy behind such a special category approach
helps to provide a buffer against traditional fears that mental distress
claims might be fabricated, inflated, vexingly small, or too remote, it is
better to deal with such concerns directly and systematically under the
ordinary principles of contract law. If the plaintiff cannot prove her mental
distress, the claim under that head of damages should be dismissed. If the
plaintiff has exaggerated her claim, the court can award a reduced quantum.
Where the amount of distress suffered has been small and insignificant, the
court can invoke the de minimis maxim. And if mental distress is not a

127. Supra note 98 at para. 58. Accord Lord Steyn in Farley,supra note 50, and K.B. Soh in "Anguish,
Foreseeability and Policy," supra note 107.
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reasonably foreseeable consequence of breach, the claim is not sustainable
under the Hadley principle.
As already noted, however, there is a danger in applying the
foreseeability approach alone that the non-pecuniary content of the contract
will go undetected and be marginalized in relation to its traditionallyrecognized, non-pecuniary content. On the footing that claims for
intangibles should be treated like any other claim, the following section
provides a proposed restatement of the general rule.
V. Proposedrestatement of the general rule
The proposed restatement of the general rule against recovery for mental
distress damages is in fact a repeal of it.
Instead of a court invoking the general rule and then determining
whether the contract fits within an exceptional category, the court would
instead pose the following questions:
1. Did the defendant promise the individual plaintiff important intangible,
non-pecuniarybenefits under the contract? [per Farley,was pleasure,
relaxation, peace of mind or freedom of molestation an important or
significant part of the contract?]
2. If yes, did the defendant fail to deliver those benefits, either in whole
or in part?
3. If yes, did the plaintiff suffer any loss, including non-pecuniary loss
such as mental suffering?
4.

Ifyes, is there proofthat the mental distress is more than simplyfleeting?
[i.e., was the distress beyond disappointment or hurt feelings?]

5.

If yes, did the defendant's breach cause that loss?

6. If yes, was the plaintiff's loss reasonably foreseeable? In the words of
Judge Borins in Newell, the court would simply ask "[w]as the contract
such that the parties must have contemplated that its breach might entail
128
mental distress, such as frustration, annoyance or disappointment?"
If the answer to all these questions is 'yes', then the plaintiff is entitled to
general damages for mental distress. The court must then proceed to assess
quantum, keeping in mind that recovery for mental distress should, at least
in the ordinary case, be restrained.
The above restatement is offered as a replacement for the special
categories approach which puts the judiciary in an unnecessary straitjacket. But this is not to suggest that the foreseeability test deployed by
128. Supra note 89 at para. 39.
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the Canadian courts in this area should likewise be side-lined. In short,
even where the contract is devoid of non-pecuniary promises, recovery
for mental distress under the general rules of foreseeability should remain
a possibility - albeit a more distant one. To the extent, for example, that
special circumstances have been communicated to the defendant such that
mental distress would be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of breach,
damages for intangibles should be recoverable. There is no need to fear
opening of the floodgates which the general rule against recovery purports
to forestall. As Justice Picard observes in the context of a mental distress
claim, the rule in Hadley already "has within it the means to test and limit
liability."' 12 9
A lingering irony remains, though, regardless of the approach taken
to permitting recovery for intangible loss in the commercial arena. As
Michael Bridge observes, "a belief that there is more to life than money and
property has led to the pecuniary vindication of non-pecuniary interests.
This is truly the bottom line."' 130
Conclusion
Because this paper has covered considerable terrain, it is convenient to set
out some brief conclusions.
1. Punitive damages
1. Punitive damages punish the defendant for oppressive and highhanded misconduct which offends the courts sense of decency (per
Whiten).
2. Punitive damages require the plaintiff to show a separate actionable
wrong, distinct from the breach being sued upon. The separate
actionable wrong may be a tort or another breach of contract (per
Whiten).
3. An award of punitive damages in a commercial dispute is an
extraordinary remedy (per Got).
2. Aggravated damages
1. Aggravated damages compensate the plaintiff for intangibles such
as pain, anguish, humiliation (per Huf) due to the defendant's
reprehensible or outrageous conduct (per Whiten).
2. Plaintiff must show that the defendant committed an independent
actionable wrong (per Whiten).
129. Kempling, supra note 92 at para. 69.
130. Supra note 125 at 370.
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3. There is controversy as to whether aggravated damages and general
distress damages are the same or different. The author takes the
position that they are different. Aggravated damages measure the
defendant's conduct at time of breach and compensate the plaintiff
for the additional emotional harm caused. General damages for
mental distress assess the matter from the parties' perspective at
the time of contract.
4.

Aggravated damages are rare in the commercial arena for the simple
reason that only individuals can experience the pain, anguish or
grief generated by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Corporate
plaintiffs are therefore not entitled to aggravated damages (per
Pinewood Recording Studios, Walker).

3. Generaldamagesfor mental distress
1. Assuming there is a distinction between aggravated damages and
general damages for mental distress, the distinction is this: general
damages for mental distress compensate for intangibles such as
pain and anguish resulting from the fact of breach (rather than the
manner of breach).
2.

The general rule is that there is no recovery of general damages for
mental distress in a breach of contract scenario.

3. There are many rationales for the rule, including: contract-breaking
is to be met with mental fortitude (Johnson);courts may experience
open floodgates but for the rule (Warrington); plaintiffs may
otherwise fabricate or exaggerate their mental distress; and mental
distress may not be reasonably foreseeable in the commercial
arena and therefore not recoverable under Hadley.
4.

Courts have evolved exceptions to the general rule against recovery
in order to afford justice to the deserving plaintiff.

5.

Exceptions to the general rule against recovery have taken three
approaches: determine whether the contract is commercial or
non-commercial, permitting recovery only in the latter case; on a
related front, determine whether the contract fits within a category
of exceptions to the general rule such that mental distress damages
would be recoverable; or, thirdly, apply the simple principles of
foreseeability without preliminary regard to the type of contract
or its classification. These strategies have not yet been reconciled
by the courts and therefore make this area of law problematic to
summarize.
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6.

The approach based on the contract being commercial or noncommercial breaks down on analysis (Gill).

7.

The approach based on the contract fitting within an establish
categories requires the plaintiff to go beyond demonstrating that
general damages for mental distress were reasonably foreseeable.
The plaintiff must establish that the contract at bar fits with
an exception. Examples of contracts within the exceptions
include: vacation contracts (Jarvis et al); contracts associated
with a wedding (Diesen et al); employment contracts (Wallace);
insurance contracts (Warrington); and contracts for luxury chattels
(Wharton et al). Contracts between solicitor and client may also
be a category but this is less certain. The Ontario Court of Appeal
in Benaiah permitted recovery for mental distress damages due to
the solicitor's incompetence, but under the law of negligence. The
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Hagblom permitted recovery
but was not required to choose a basis for that determination. In
Maillot, mental distress damages were disallowed based on the
categories approach.

8.

This "special categories" approach can be criticized on several
grounds:
* the law of contracts ordinarily permits recovery for reasonably
foreseeable loss. Why have a special rule for intangible loss?
(Gill)
* once intangible harm is accepted as being compensable, there
is no logical reason to artificially restrict it (Professor Veitch)
* though the categories approach has a gate-keeping function
to stave off a floodgate of inflated claims, trivial complaints,
and fictitious allegations, this function can be performed by
ordinary contract law principles (i.e., the plaintiff must prove
her claim and establish quantum; if the quantum is minimal,
the court should award only nominal damages or no damages
at all)
* on this basis, the special categories approach needlessly
complicates the law

9. The third approach is to permit recovery based on foreseeability
alone (Newell, Gill, Kempling). Was mental distress a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of breach?
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10. Instead of gate-keeping through categories of cases, ordinary
contract law principles would perform that function, including, of
course the principle of Hadley but also such doctrines as de minimis
non curatlex.
11. No matter what theory the court applies to recovery, the plaintiff
seeking general damages or mental distress does not have to
establish an independent, actionable wrong Warrington).
4. Over-archingrules regardless of approachto general damagesfor
mental distress
1. Corporate plaintiffs cannot recover under this head of damage
because corporations cannot experience human emotions
(Walker).
2.

The plaintiff must prove that distress is more than fleeting.

3. Quantum must be restrained and modest. To reiterate Lord Steyn's
warning: "It is important that logical and beneficial developments
in this corner of the law should not contribute to the creation of a
society bent on litigation."''

131. Farley,supra note 50 at para. 28.

